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1. Introduction 
Some evidence is widely documented in experimental studies from social 
psychology that individuals often choose an alternative deemed inferior ex ante 
(e.g. unhealthy food) confirming that consumers present some preference-bias 
(Strotz, 1956; Rabin; 1997; Gul and Pesendorfer;1999). Gul and Pesendorfer 
(1999) provided a good example of this inconsistency in preferences, which occurs 
when a satiated individual prefers the healthy, vegetarian dish, whereas he craves 
for a hamburger when he is hungry. Also, Loewenstein et al. (2003) stated that 
some negative affective states that individuals experience at the exact moment 
when they make the decision between outcomes occurring at different points of the 
time have a huge importance. The author coined the term “projection bias” to 
describe a more general phenomenon of mistaken prediction that occurs when 
individuals have difficulty predicting when they will be in a different emotional “cold” 
state because their current “hot” state overrides them. Therefore, even though 
individuals understand the directions in which their tastes will change in the future, 
they systematically underestimate or overestimate the magnitude of these 
changes. The reason of this mistaken prediction is motivated by some affective 
states well-known as “visceral factors” (Loewenstein, 1996; 2003, 2005). The term 
visceral factors refer to wide range of negative emotions (ager, fear) and drive 
states (hunger, thirty, sexual desire) that can motive people to engage impulsive 
behaviour called “out of control”, characterized by unplanned and unconscious 
cognitive mediation (Bolles, 1975; Loewenstein, 1996; Loewenstein, 2003). For 
example, hunger state can be considered an aversive visceral factor that 
generates the desirability of food if an appetite-visceral mechanism is triggered by 
 1
immediate availability of food (Loewenstein, 1996). According to Loewenstein 
(1996), a sufficient level of intensity of hunger causes people to behave “out of 
control” because they behave contrary to their own long-term health self-interest, 
often with full awareness that they are doing so.  
Evidence of projection bias with respect to food choice revealed that people 
who are in their hottest emotional state of hunger buy too much food (Read and 
van Leeuwen, 1998; Gilbert et al., 2002). To illustrate, Read and van Leeuwen 
(1998) developed an experiment with office workers, who were either hungry or 
satiated and were asked to choose a healthy and non-healthy snacks (e.g. fruit vs. 
candy bars) to be delivered in a week’s time, either at a time when they were 
expected to be hungry or satiated. The results from this experiment confirmed that 
workers chose non-healthy snacks when they were expected to be hungry. In 
addition, if they were hungry at the moment of the buying decision, they were also 
more likely to choose the candy bar for any other subsequent occasion they faced. 
Therefore, individuals project their current hunger levels onto their future 
preferences.  
The mentioned study by Read and Leeuwen, (1998) on projection bias focused on 
hypothetical choices where consumers were not incentivized to reveal their true 
preferences for these food products at the exact moment they were hungry or 
satiated. However, even though our study has a similar aim, to test the possible 
existence of projection bias in consumers’ decision for food, our novel contribution 
is that we designed an experiment were participants were incentivised to reveal 
their true preferences. Thus, our research question is: Does projection bias still 
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exist in consumers’ decisions for food when a real experiment is used to incentive 
participants to reveal their true preferences for food products? 
To answer to this question, we conducted a real experimental auction with two 
different treatments. Subjects who participated in both treatments were incentivized 
to reveal their true willingness to pay for different cheese products. However, the 
treatments differed by the timing when the auctioned cheese was delivered to 
participants in the future. In both treatments the experiment was set at lunch time 
when participants were expected to be hungry. In addition, while Read and 
Leeuwen (1998) manipulated the hunger state by varying the time of the day when 
participants made their choice, in our study we manipulated the level of appetite of 
participants by feeding them with enough food to get satiated during the 
experiment. This is the second contribution of our paper. To our knowledge there is 
not study which tested the existence of projection bias in consumers’ food 
decisions by using a real experiment where the level of appetite of participants was 
controlled by feeding them with some food during the experiment.  
The rest of the article is organized as follows. The next section discusses the 
experimental design, the rationale for the inclusion of the different treatments and 
the hypotheses and describe the implementation of the auction. The results are 
presented in section 3 and the final section discusses the importance and the 
implications of the findings.  
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2. Methodology  
2.1 General experiment design   
To test the existence of projection bias, we designed a real experimental 
auction with two treatments where each respondent participated only in one of the 
treatments. In the first treatment, called “future hunger” (H1), participants were 
asked to reveal their WTPs for food products when they were currently hungry in 
the experiment (H0, called currently hungry) and satiated (S0, called currently 
satiated) being informed that they would get the product, if they win, the next day 
before lunch time when they were expected to be hungry (H1). In the second 
treatment, called “future satiated” (S1), participants were asked to reveal their 
WTPs for food products when they were hungry (H0) and satiated (S0) being 
informed that they would get the food product, if they win, the next day after lunch 
time when they were expected to be satiated (S1).  
Among the different experimental auction procedures we used the full bidding 
and among the different price mechanisms, we opted to use the nth random price 
with repeated round (6 rounds) to benefit from the learning effect as stated by 
several authors (Alfnes and Rickersen, 2003; Lusk and Shogren, 2007; Shogreen 
et al., 2001; Shogren, 2006) who argue that this procedure yields valuations more 
consistent with neoclassical economic theory.  Moreover, we decided to use a 
price mechanism without price feedback  to prevent the possible bid affiliation 
effects and other psychological effects (such as competition or anchoring effects) 
from the participants’ level of hungry that was manipulated in our experiment 
avoiding having confounding effects between them. To control the hunger and 
satiated state of participants in the experiment, we manipulated their appetite or 
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hunger status by feeding them with the same amount of unrelated foods and 
beverage (e.g tortilla, vegetables, potatoes, squid, “tapas” and water) after the third 
round of the auction. In order to attempt similar meal situation, the sessions were 
settled up at the same time before lunch (1:00 pm) during the week day when 
people were expected to be hungry. Because the delivery of the product was delay 
to the next day and in order to avoid the transaction costs, subjects received a 
signed document where the experimenters stated to be obliged to hand-delivered 
the product to their job place or at home.  
We selected for the experiment a semi-cured by pasteurized sheep milk cheese 
produced in the Castilla-La-Mancha region in Spain. In particular, we used four 
different versions of this cheese: the cheese without any claim, the cheese with a 
health-related claim (nutritional claim indicating a fat reduced content “light1”), the 
cheese with a regional claim (“Designation of origin- DOP”) and, the cheese with 
an organic claim (the European organic logo). The experiment was conducted in 
the region of Aragón (Spain), in the town of Zaragoza during May-June 2012. In 
total, 98 participants were randomly selected from different locations across the 
city using a stratified sampling procedure by age, gender and education level.  
 
2.2. Hypotheses testing 
In order to answer to our research question, whether projection bias still exists 
in consumers’ decisions for food when participants are incentivised to reveal their 
true Willingness to Pay (WTP) for food product, we test two hypotheses. The first 
hypothesis is whether the willingness to pay (WTP) for the different claimed cheese 
                                                 
1 The cheese with this claim (“light”) contained 40% less fat than the other cheeses in the experiment. 
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products (light, DOP and, organic) revealed by participants when they are currently 
hungry in the experiment (H0) but who anticipated being satiated in the future2 (S1) 
are equal to both the WTPs of cheese products (light, DOP and, organic) elicited 
when participants are currently satiated in the experiment (S0) but they predicted 
being satiated in the future (S1), and also equal to the WTPs of cheese products 
(light, DOP and, organic) offered by participants when they are currently hungry in 
the experiment (H0) but they anticipated being also hungry in the future (H1) 
defined by the following null hypotheses: 
 
10101010 HHSH
11
HHSH
11 WTP<WTP=1HWTP=WTP=0H .. ;  
10101010 SSSH
21
SSSH
21 WTP>WTP=1HWTP=WTP=0H .. ;  
 
If one or both null hypotheses are rejected we can conclude that projection 
bias exists because of the influence of being currently hungry (H0) in the “future 
satiated” treatment (S1) on WTPs. Participants currently hungry (H0) who will 
receive the cheese products when they expect to be satiated in the future (S1) 
would be less willing to pay to get the product than those participants who are also 
currently hungry (H0) but they know that they will receive the cheese when they 
expect to be hungry in the future (H1), since the latter ones have a greater desire to 
get the product due to their future hungry state. However, those participants 
(currently hungry (H0) who will receive the cheese when they expect to be satiated 
(S1)) overestimate their WTPs, because they are willingness to pay for the cheese 
                                                 
2 When they will finally received the product (in one day time) 
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products more than when they are currently satiated (S0) and anticipated being 
also satiated in the future (S1) because of the greater desire to get the product in 
their currently hunger state.  
Therefore, the WTPs revealed by hungry participants (H0) in the “future 
satiated” treatment (S1) are bias in comparison with the WTPs elicited by both 
currently hungry participants (H0) in the “future hungry” treatment (H1) and 
currently satiated (S0) in the same “future satiated” treatment (S1). 
In the same way the second hypothesis to test is whether the WTPs for 
different claimed cheese products (light, DOP and, organic) revealed by 
participants currently satiated (S0) who anticipated being hungry in the future (H1) 
are equal to both the WTPs of cheese products (light, DOP and, organic) elicited 
by participants currently hungry (H0) who predict to be also hungry in the future 
(H1), and also equal to the WTPs of cheese products (light, DOP and, organic) 
offered by those currently satiated participants (S0) who anticipated being satiated 
in the future (S1) defined by the following null hypotheses:  
 
10
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10
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12 WTP<WTP=1HWTP=WTP=0H .. ;  
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10 WTP>WTP=1HWTP=WTP=0H HS12
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If one or both null hypotheses are rejected we can conclude that projection bias 
exists because of the influence of being currently satiated (S0) in the “future 
hungry” treatment (H1) on WTPs. Currently satiated participants (S0) who will 
predict to receive the cheese product when they expect to be hungry in the future 
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(H1) will increase their desire to get the products. However, because of their 
currently satiated state, these subjects would be less willing to pay to get products 
than when they are currently hungry (H0) and expected to be hungry in the future 
(H1), because they have a greater desire to get the product as they are currently 
hungry. However, those participants currently satiated (S0) who expect to be 
hungry in the future (H1) overestimate their WTPs. In other words, they are 
willingness to pay for the cheese products more than those participants currently 
satiated (S0) who expect to be also satiated in the future (S1) because the former 
participants would have a greater desire to get the product due to their future 
hunger state.  
 
2.3 Implementation of auction 
A total of 8 sessions with at least 12 participants were conducted. After arrival 
of the participants, they were informed that they would receive 10 € participation 
fee at the end of the session. We chose 10 € as participation fee because the 
market price of the cheese without any claim lied between € 1.25 and € 1.50 for 
100 grams of product. 
After subjects consented to participate in the auction, they were assigned an ID 
number and were asked to complete a questionnaire requesting information on 
socioeconomic and demographic characteristics as well as a question to measure 
participants’ level of hunger. In particular, the question commonly used by Poppitt 
et al (1998) and Keim et al(1998)  to assess self-reported hunger of individuals was 
included in the questionnaire. Participants were asked to give their degree of 
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subjective feelings of hunger, asking a question “How hungry are you? , in a likert 
scale where 1 indicates “not at all” and 5 indicates the highest intensity of hungry.  
After the completion of this questionnaire, participants received the product 
information and the experimental auction instructions and they were asked to read 
them. Then, the experimenter read the auction instructions aloud emphasizing that 
their dominant strategy was to reveal their true values and that one round and one 
product will be randomly drawn as binding. They also informed participants that if 
they win the product they had to buy and pay for it right after the experiment but 
that they will receive the product the next day (before or after lunch depending on 
the treatment) at home or office by the experimenters. After the practice auction, 
the cheese auction was undertaken in the following steps:   
Step 1. Subjects were asked to simultaneously submit a bid for each of the four 
cheese products. The bids were collected and ranked from highest to lowest but 
they were not posted to participants.  
Step 2. Step 1 was repeated for two additional rounds.  
Step 3. After the end of the third round, the hunger status of participants was 
manipulated by providing them a amount of unrelated foods (e.g tortilla, 
vegetables, squid, “tapas” and water), asking them to eat until they fell satiated.  
Step 4. After eating, participants came back to the lab and they were asked to 
assess again their self-reported hunger, asking the question “How hungry are you?  
Step 5. Then, they were asked to simultaneously submit bid for each of the four 
cheese products for three additional rounds. The bids were collected and ranked 
from highest to lowest but they were not posted.  
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Step 6.  When all the rounds were conducted, a random drawing determined which 
of the six rounds was binding. Then, a random drawing determined which of the 
four cheeses product was binding.  
Step 7.  The top n-1 bidders on the binding product in the binding round had to 
purchase the cheese product and paid a price equivalent to the nth highest bid for 
the product. However, those bidders received the cheese at home or office 
depending of what they prefer the next day in accordance with conditions 
stipulated in the “agreement” and depending on the treatment they participated 
(before lunch or after lunch).  
 
3. Results  
 
Table 1 reports the sample characteristics and the definition of the socio-demographic 
variables for the two treatments. A total of 48 subjects participated in the “future hunger” 
treatment (H1) and 50 individuals in the “future satiated” (S1) treatment.  
 
(INSERT TABLE 1) 
 
We used the Kruskal-Wallis test to determine if there are significant differences in 
socio-demographic variables across the three treatments. The results of the tests suggest 
that there are no statistically significant differences across treatments by gender (p-value = 
0.427), age (p-value= 0.861), education (p-value = 0.874) and income (p-value = 0.707). 
The results of these tests suggest that our randomization was successful in equalizing the 
characteristics of participants across the three treatments.  
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For the analysis, we excluded the first two rounds because they were used to allow 
participants to learn and gain experience with the mechanism. In addition, we excluded 
also the last two rounds (5th and 6th) to eliminate “end-period” effects. Hence, we only 
included rounds 3 and 4 in the analysis to compare bids immediately before and after the 
manipulation of the participants’ hunger level. This procedure is similar to what Roosen et 
al. (1996) and Lusk et al. (2004) adopted in their analysis3.  
Table 2 shows the mean level of self-reported hunger of participants. We note that the 
mean of self-reported hunger level of participants before and after the manipulation of their 
hunger were statistically different from each other at the 5% significance level in both 
treatments (H1 and S1). These results indicate that participants stated a significantly lower 
self-reported level of hunger after having eaten the food offered to them after the 3rd round. 
This result suggests that the participants were indeed hungry when they came to the 
experiment and before eating the food given to them (H0) and that they became satiated 
afterwards (S0). Hence, we are able to test our projection bias hypotheses by comparing 
currently hungry or satiated participants between treatments.  
 
(INSERT TABLE 2) 
 
Table 3 reports the mean marginal WTPs for the three cheeses with claims (“light”, 
“DOP” and “organic” cheese vis-à-vis the cheese product without claim)4 in the two 
treatments when participants were currently hungry (H0)) and when participants were 
currently satiated (S0) together with the t-test of equality between WTP across treatments 
and rounds. Following Alfnes and Rickerten (2011), we used the marginal WTP instead of 
                                                 
3 We also conducted an analysis using data from all the rounds and similar results were found.   
 
4 Difference between bid for the cheese with the “light”, “DOP” and “organic” claim and the cheese 
product without claims, respectively  
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the total WTP (bids) since relative prices matter more. Alfnes and Rickerten (2011) also 
pointed out that testing should include a test of the relative valuations. These t-tests allow 
us to test our two research hypotheses.  
First, we observed that the marginal WTPs when participants were currently hungry 
(H0) were higher than the marginal WTPs when participants were currently satiated (S0) 
for the three products in the two treatments. Moreover, we notice that for the three cheese 
products, the WTP values of participants who were currently hungry (H0) who anticipated 
being hungry in the future (H1) were the highest. On the other hand, the WTP values of the 
participants who were currently satiated (S0) and who predicted being satiated in the future 
(S1) were the lowest (except for the cheese with the “organic” claim).  
Related to the first hypothesis, we see that the WTP values for the three cheese 
products for the currently hungry (H0) participants who anticipated being satiated in the 
future (S1) were lower (0.037, 0.213 and 0.156, respectively for the “light”, “DOP” and 
“organic” claim) than the WTP values revealed by participants currently hungry (H0) who 
predicted beinghungry in the future (H1) (0.21, 0.299 and 0.30, respectively for the “light”, 
“DOP” and “organic” claim). Moreover, the t-tests showed that the null hypothesis of 
equality between them were rejected at the 5% significance level for the cheese with the 
“light” and “organic” claims, indicating that the WTP values were statistically different(-1.99 
and -2.02, respectively). On the other hand, the WTP values for participants currently 
hungry (H0) who anticipated being satiated in the future (S1) are higher than the WTP 
values for participants currently satiated (S0) who anticipated being satiated in the future 
(S1) for the cheeses with the “light” and “DOP” claims. However, the t-test indicated that 
the null hypothesis of equality was not rejected at the 5% significance level (0.7 and 0.89, 
respectively). These results suggest that the currently hungry participants (H0) made some 
mistake in their prediction when revealing their WTP values for the cheese with the “light” 
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and “organic” claims when they expected to be satiated in the future (S1). This result 
seems to indicate that projection bias exist. 
Related to the second hypothesis, we see in table 3 that the WTP values for 
participants currently satiated (S0) who anticipated being hungry in the future (H1) were 
lower than the WTP values for participants currently hungry (H0) who anticipated being 
hungry in the future (H1) for the three cheese products. However, the t-tests indicate that 
the null hypotheses of equality between the WTPs were not rejected at the 5% significance 
level (1.07, 1.01 and 0.46, respectively). On the other hand, the WTP values for 
participants currently satiated (S0) who anticipated being hungry in the future (H1) were 
higher than the WTP values for participants currently satiated (S0) who predicted to be 
satiated in the future (S1) for the three cheese products. Moreover, the t-tests indicate that 
the null hypothesis of equality between the WTP values was rejected at the 5% significant 
level for the cheese with the “light” and “DOP” claims (2.3 and 1.81, respectively). Hence, 
the currently satiated participants (S0) made some prediction mistakes when revealing 
their WTPs for the “light” and “DOP” cheese if they expected to be hungry in the future 
(H1), suggesting that projection bias exists.  
 
 (INSERT TABLE 3) 
 
Although we did not find statistically significant differences in the socio-demographic 
profiles of participants between the two treatments, we take these characteristics into 
account to corroborate whether our previous results hold when we control for participants’ 
socio-demographic profiles. Therefore, we modelled the marginal WTPs for the three 
cheese products as a function of socio-demographic variables and dummy variables 
corresponding to the different treatments and type of participants (currently hungry and 
satiated). To be able to test our hypotheses, we calculated four dummy variables: i) 
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dumH0H1 which takes value 1 for currently hungry participants (H0) in the “future hungry” 
treatment (H1) and zero otherwise; ii) dumS0H1 which takes value 1 for currently satiated 
participants (S0) in the “future hungry” treatment (H1) and zero otherwise; iii) dumS0S1 
which takes value 1 for currently satiated participants (S0) in the “future satiated” treatment 
(S1) and zero otherwise; and i) dumH0S1 which takes value 1 for currently hungry 
participants (H0) in the “future satiated” treatment (S1) and zero otherwise. Moreover, we 
included a set of socio-demographic variables as defined in table 2 (i.e., Female, years, 
university and lowincome).  
Hence, to test the first research hypothesis, we specified the following model:   
 
iti7i6i5i4
it103it102it1010it
ε+lowincomeb+universityb+yearsb+femaleb+
+HdumSb+SdumSb+HdumHb+b=WTP )()()(
  
(1) 
for each of the three cheese products. WTPit is the marginal WTP values for the ith 
consumer in the tth round (3rd and 4th roungs). So if b1 and b2 are not statistically different 
from zero (both individually and jointly considered), then, projection bias does not exist. On 
the other hand, if b1 is statistically positive and/or b2 is statistically negative, we can 
conclude that projection bias exists.  
In the same way, to test the second research hypothesis we specified the following 
model:  
 
iti7i6i5i4
it103it102it1010it
ε+lowincomec+universityc+yearsc+femalec+
+SdumHc+SdumSc+HdumHc+c=WTP )()()(
  
(2) 
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for each of the three cheese products. WTPit is the marginal WTP values for the ith 
consumer in the tth round (3rd and 4th roungs). So if c1 and c2 are not statistically different 
from zero (both individually and jointly considered), then projection bias does not exist. On 
the other hand, if c1 is statistically positive and/or c2 is statistically negative, we can 
conclude that projection bias exists.  
We estimated the model defined by equation (1) and equation (2), using a random 
effects model to take into account individuals’ heterogeneity (Baltagi, 2003). Estimated 
coefficients for the cheese with the “light”, “DOP” and, “organic” claims for the two 
equations (model 1 and model 2) are presented in table 4, table 5 and table 6, 
respectively. 
In table 4, we can see that the estimated coefficient for the dummy variable dumH0H1 
(b1) in model 1 is positive and statistically different from zero at the 5% significance level. 
This result means that the WTP values for the cheese with the “light” claim of currently 
hungry participants (H0) in the “future satiated” treatment (S1) are statistically lower than 
the WTP values for currently hungry participants (H0) in the “future hungry” treatment (H1). 
Moreover, the estimated coefficient for the dummy variable dumS0S1 (b2) is not 
statistically different from zero at the 5% significance level which means that the WTP 
values for the cheese with the “light” claim of currently hungry participants (H0) in the 
“future satiated” treatment (S1) are statistically not different from the WTP values for 
currently satiated participants (S0) in the “future satiated” treatment (S1). These results 
corroborate the previous results exhibited in table 3, suggesting that projection bias exists 
because currently hungry participants were willing to pay more to get the cheese with the 
“light” claim when they anticipated being hungry in the future than when they anticipated 
being satiated.  
Likewise, in model 2, the estimated coefficient for the dummy variable dumH0H1 (c1) is 
positive and statistically significant at the 10 % significance level while the estimated 
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coefficient for the dummy variable dumS0S1 (c2) is negative and statistically significant at 
the 10% significance level. These findings suggest that the WTPs for the cheese with the 
“light” claim of currently satiated participants (S0) in the “future hungry” treatment (H1) are 
statistically lower than the WTP values of subjects who were currently hungry (H0) in the 
“future hungry” treatment (H1). However, the later WTPs were  statistically higher than the 
WTPs revealed by currently satiated individuals (S0) in the “future satiated” treatment (S1). 
These results are similar to the ones found in table 3 indicating that projection bias exists 
because of the influence of being currently satiated (S0) in the “future hungry” treatment 
(H1) on WTPs.  
Participants currently satiated (S0) who will receive the cheese product when they 
expect to be hungry in the future (H1) would be less willing to pay for the products than 
when they are currently hungry (H0) and expected to be hungry in the future (H1). 
However, the participants currently satiated (S0) who expect to be hungry in the future (H1) 
would be willing to pay for the cheese products more than the participants currently 
satiated (S0) who expect to be also satiated in the future (S1).  
 
(INSERT TABLE 4) 
 
Table 5 reports the estimated coefficient for the cheese with the “DOP” claim. We 
can observe that the estimated coefficients for the dummy variables dumH0H1 and 
dumS0S1 are not statistically significant different from zero at the 5% level both in model 1 
and model 2. This result implies that our two hypotheses were not rejected and hence, the 
participants did not exhibit projection bias when revealing their WTPs for cheese with the 
“DOP” claim. These results are slightly different from the ones in table 3 where the second 
hypothesis (in particular, ) was rejected at the 5% significant level.   2.20H
 16
 (INSERT TABLE 5) 
 
Finally, table 6 shows that the coefficient for the dummy variable dumH0H1 in model 1 is 
positive and statistically different from zero at the 5% significance level. This result 
indicates that the WTP values for the cheese with the “organic” claim elicited by currently 
hungry participants (H0) in the “future satiated” treatment (S1) are significantly lower than 
the WTPs of currently hungry participants (H0) in the “future hungry” treatment (H1). In 
addition, the estimated coefficients for the dummy variable dumS0S1 in model 1 and the 
dummy variable dumH0H1  and dumS0S1 in model 2 are statistically not different from 
zero. These results are the same as the ones found in table 3 indicating that projection 
bias exists because hungry participants were willing to pay more to get the cheese with the 
“organic” claim when they anticipated being hungry in the future than when they 
anticipated being satiated. Hence, we can confirm that projection bias exists for the 
cheese product with the “organic” claim. 
 
(INSERT TABLE 6) 
 
4. Conclusions 
 
It is widely documented in experimental settings from social psychology literature that 
individuals can often choose an alternative deemed inferior ex ante because a sufficient 
level of hunger can cause people to behave “out of control” and consequently will make 
decisions that are not in their best interest (e.g., in terms of their long-term health), often 
with full awareness that they are doing so (Loewenstein, 1996; Rabin (1997;). Loewenstein 
et al. (2003) coined the term “projection bias” to describe a more general phenomenon of 
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mistaken prediction that occurs when individuals have difficulty predicting when they will 
be in a different emotional “cold” state (e.g. satiated) because their current “hot” state (e.g. 
hunger) overrides them. Therefore, while individuals understand the directions in which 
their tastes will change, they can be prone to systematically underestimating or 
overestimating the magnitude of these changes.  
As previously mentioned, past studies from the behavioural economics literature (e.g., 
Read and Leeuwen, 2002; Gilbert et al., 2002) focused on hypothetical choices or non-
hypothetical field experiments to test projection bias. Our study differs from these past 
studies in various ways. First, we tested the existence of projection bias using a non-
hypothetical lab experiment (i.e., experimental auction). Specifically, we examined whether 
projection bias exists when hungry and non-hungry subjects were incentivized to reveal 
their WTPs. Second, in order to avoid selection bias, we conducted all the sessions of our 
experiment at the same time (i.e., lunch time) instead of “before and after lunch” utilized in 
previous studies. To manipulate hunger level, we fed participants to make them satiated 
after a few rounds of auction. Third, instead of using different types of products, we used 
four different versions of the same product which corresponded to four different product 
claims (i.e., without claim, “light”, “DOP” and “organic”), holding other product 
characteristics constant. 
Our results confirm the existence of projection bias when consumers made their  
decisions about food products. In particular, we found the existence of projection bias in 
two out of the three analyzed cheese products with claims. Specifically, projection bias 
exists because our currently hungry participants were willing to pay more to get the cheese 
with the “light” and “organic” claim when they anticipated being hungry in the future than 
when they anticipated being satiated. Second, projection bias exists because for any 
current hunger or satiated state (H0 and S0), the participants were willing to pay more for 
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the cheese with the “light” claim when they anticipated being hungry in the future (H1) than 
when they anticipated being satiated (S1). 
However, our results also suggest that individuals´ preferences are not dynamically 
inconsistent because participants were still willing to pay more for DOP and organic 
cheese than for “light” one when they were satiated or when they anticipated being  
satiated. In other words, participants did not give a disproportionate weight to short-term 
benefits and cost when bidding in the auction.   
Our findings generally confirm that projection bias is prevalent in food decisions, since 
individuals` willingness to pay is influenced by their current and future hunger level, 
implying that it would be better for individuals to avoid buying food when they are in their 
“hungry” state. This finding has implications for food companies and retailers when 
launching a new product with specific claims in the food market. Since we found that 
hunger participants (current and future) would be more willing to pay to get the food 
product, the communication and promotion campaigns designed by food companies 
should be done in the specific time of the day when consumers are expected to be hungry. 
As trying the first time the product is the precursor of liking and then, re-buying, 
advertisement on TV, and tasting promotions on the store should be scheduled before 
lunch or dinner when consumers are expected to be hunger because of their greater 
desire to try the product.   
Our results have also significant implications for the design and use of non-hypothetical 
experimental auctions to elicit WTP values from subjects for food products. For example, 
our results suggest that if participants has projection bias, their bidding decisions can be 
influenced by their current level of hunger or satiety. This finding is important since hunger 
levels of participants are not normally measured in experimental auctions. Given the 
increasing importance and use of experimental auctions to elicit consumers’ preferences 
and WTP valuesfor marketing and policy purposes, researchers and practitioners should 
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take into account the hunger level and control for this factor when designing the 
experimental auction. If they do not take this into account, their valuations could be 
confounded by participants’ projection bias.  
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Table 1. Sample characteristics and demographic variables definition (%, unless stated) 
  Treatment  
Variable definition Name (type) Future 
hungry  
(H1) 
Future  
Satiated  
(S1) 
Test  
(p-value)a 
Gender 
  Male 
  Female  
 
FEMALE (dummy 
1=female; 0 otherwise) 
 
50.0 
50.0 
 
42.0 
58.0 
 
0.631 
(0.427) 
Age (average) 
  
YEARS (continuous)  
 
47.0 46.0 0.259 
(0.796) 
Education of respondent  
  Elementary School  
  High School  
  University  
UNIVERSITY(dummy 
1=university degree; 
0 otherwise) 
 
 
16.67 
54.17 
29.17 
 
16.00 
50.00 
34.00 
 
 
0.2692 
(0.874) 
Average Household monthly 
Income 
  Between € 600 and € 1,500  
  Between € 1,501 and €2,500  
  More than 2,500    
LOWINCOME(dummy 
1=less than € 1,500;  
0 otherwise 
 
 
21.28 
57.45 
21.28 
 
 
23.91 
50.00 
26.09 
 
 
0.538 
(0.764) 
 
# participants 
 
48 50  
athe Kruskal-Wallis non-parametric test was calculated. 
 
 
Table 2. Level of self-reported participants hunger across treatments (H1 and S1) 
 Future hungry  
(H1) 
Future satiated 
(S1) 
 Round 3  
(H0) 
Round 4 
(S0) 
Round 3  
(H0) 
Round 4 
(S0) 
Hunger level  
 
2.87 
 
1.23 
 
2.74 
 
1.48 
t-test (p-value) 
8.90 (0.000)* 9.03 (0.000)* 
* and ** denote statistically significant differences at  10% and 5%, respectively 
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 Table 3. Average marginal WTPs by treatment and round (€/ per 100 grams package for cheese) 
 
Future hungry  
(H1) 
Future satiated 
(S1) 
 
Hungry  
(H0) 
Satiated  
(S0) 
Hungry
 (H0) 
Satiated 
(S0) 
"Light”” cheese: 0.210  0.135 0.037 -0.02 
t-test of equality (p-value): 
10101010
1111 10
HHSH
.
HHSH
. WTPWTPH;WTPWTPH   
10101010
2121 10
SSSH
.
SSSH
. WTPWTPH;WTPWTPH   
10
10
10
10
2212 10
HH
.
HH
. WTPWTPH;WTPWTPH
HSHS   
10
10
10
10
1222 10
SSSS
WTPWTPH;WTPWTPH HS.
HS
.   
 
 
 
-1.99 (0.02)* 
0.70 (0.24)  
 
1.07 (0.14) 
 
2.30 (0.01)*  
"DOP" cheese 0.299 0.238 0.213  0.159 
t-test of equality (p-value): 
10101010
1111 10
HHSH
.
HHSH
. WTPWTPH;WTPWTPH   
10101010
2121 10
SSSH
.
SSSH
. WTPWTPH;WTPWTPH   
10
10
10
10
2212 10
HH
.
HH
. WTPWTPH;WTPWTPH
HSHS   
10
10
10
10
1222 10
SSSS
WTPWTPH;WTPWTPH HS.
HS
.   
 
 
 
-1.18 (0.11) 
 
0.89(0.18) 
1.01(0.15) 
 
   1.81(0.03)*  
“Organic" cheese: 0.300 0.262 0.156 0.173 
t-test of equality (p-value): 
10101010
1111 10
HHSH
.
HHSH
. WTPWTPH;WTPWTPH   
10101010
2121 10
SSSH
.
SSSH
. WTPWTPH;WTPWTPH   
10
10
10
10
2212 10
HH
.
HH
. WTPWTPH;WTPWTPH
HSHS   
10
10
10
10
1.22.2 1;0
SSSS
WTPWTPHWTPWTPH HSHS   
 
  
 
     -2.02 (0.02)* 
 
-0.25 (0.39) 
 
0.46 (0.32) 
1.18 (0.11)  
* * and ** denote statistically significant differences at  10% and 5%, respectively 
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 Table 4. Coefficient estimates from random effects regression for the  “light” cheese product
 Model 1 Model 2  
Variables Coef p-value Coef p-value 
dumH0H1 0.154 0.045 0.075 0.068 
dumS0S1 -0.06 -1.49 -0.139 0.071 
dumS0H1 0.079 0.304 --- --- 
dumH0S1 --- --- -0.079 0.304 
Female  0.168 0.020 0.168 0.020 
University  -0.029 0.730 -0.029 0.730 
Years 0.003 0.135 0.003 0.135 
Lowincome -0.073 0.506 -0.073 0.506 
Constant -0.165 0.127 -0.085 0.433 
N observations  196  196  
R2 0.12 0.12   
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 Table 5. Coefficient estimates from random effects regression for the “DOP” cheese product
 Model 1 Model 2  
Variables Coef p-value Coef p-value 
dumH0H1 0.080 0.176 0.060 0.152 
dumS0S1 -0.054 0.191 -0.074 0.212 
dumS0H1 0.020 0.732 --- --- 
dumH0S1 --- --- -0.020 0.732 
Female  0.076 0.144 0.076 0.144 
University  0.069 0.256 0.069 0.256 
Years 0.001 0.386 0.001 0.386 
Lowincome -0.099 0.209 -0.099 0.209 
Constant 0.114 0.150 0.135 0.101 
N. observations  196  196  
R2 0.08  0.08  
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Table 6. Coefficient estimates from random effects regression for the “organic” cheese product
 Model 1 Model 2  
Variables Coef p-value Coef p-value 
dumH0H1 0.145 0.045 0.037 0.143 
dumS0S1 0.017 0.500 -0.090 0.212 
dumS0H1 0.107 0.138 --- --- 
dumH0S1 --- --- -0.107 0.138 
Female  0.014 0.842 0.014 0.842 
University  0.129 0.116 0.129 0.116 
Years 0.004 0.061 0.004 0.061 
Lowincome -0.026 0.802 -0.026 0.802 
Constant -0.081 0.437 0.026 0.810 
N. observations  196  196  
R2 0.106  0.106  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 28
 29
 
Annex I. Population in Spain and Zaragoza  
 
Table A1. Population by sex and age in Spain and Zaragoza (%) 
  Sex Age 
 Total Female
 
Male  0-19 20-34 35-54 55-64 More than 64 
Spain 46,148,605 50.99 49.01 19.88 20.80 31.10 11.05 17.14 
Zaragoza 952,383 50.90 49.10 18.46 19.63 30.83 11.64 19.42 
Source: Spanish Census of Population, 2011. www.ine.es 
 
 
 
 
